NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION: DOES GALLEGOS PORTEND THE
DEMISE OF THE AGRICULTURAL EXCLUSION?
Despite the fact that about eight-five percent of employed wage
and salary workers in the fifty states and the District of Columbia are
presently covered by workmen's compensation,' only nine states pro-

vide total workmen's compensation coverage for the agricultural employee. 2 More importantly, perhaps, only three of the twelve leading

farm states extend total coverage to the farm worker, and statutes in
seven of these states provide no coverage whatsoever for the agricul-

tural employee. 3 Because of the agricultural exclusion and the additional fact that the compensation laws of nineteen states are elective,
giving the employer the option of accepting or rejecting the provisions
of the act, 4 the bulk of American farm workers have found themselves
1. REPORT
LAWS 43 (1972).

OF THE NATIONAL COMMIssION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1970) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON];
REPORT

OF THE

NATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON

STATE WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

LAws (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMISSION REPORT];
U.S. BuREAu oF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES (92d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

2. For an explanation of the concept of "total" workmen's compensation coverage

and a list of the states which provide it, see note 28 infra and accompanying text.
3. Based on value of farm products sold, the twelve leading agricultural states
are, in descending order: California, Iowa, Texas, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, Indiana, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Missouri, and Ohio. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
575. Of these states, California, Wisconsin, and Ohio provide total benefits to the

agricultural laborer, see note 28 infra, while Iowa, Texas, Nebraska, Kansas, Indiana,
North Carolina, and Missouri exclude agricultural employees from the compensation
system entirely. For an explanation of the concept of "no coverage" under workmen's
compensation, and a list of states which deny compensation coverage to farm workers,
see note 34 infra and accompanying text.
4. The following states have elective workmen's compensation systems: Alabama,
ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 273 (1958); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-4-1 (1963);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.05 (1966); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2202
(1965); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. H9 44-542, -543 (1964); Louisiana, LA. Rnv.
STAT. § 23:1038 (1964); Maine, ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 21 (1964); Missouri,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.060 (1969); New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-9 (1937);
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without the relatively quick and simple means of redress provided by
workmen's compensation.
The consequences to agricultural workers of exclusion' from
the coverage of a workmen's compensation statute are quite severe.
The accidental death rate for agricultural employment ranks behind

only mining and construction as the highest among all work groups,"
and the incidence of disabling injury among farm workers is also ex•traordinarily high.

Those injured agricultural workers who are ex-

cluded from compensation coverage, or their surviving dependents, are
forced to fall back on tort actions for recovery, a remedy which the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
has termed "a drawn-out, costly, and uncertain process that was dismissed long-ago as a means of dealing with occupational injuries and

diseases. '' r The advantages of the workmen's compensation systemprompt payment with minimum legal formality in which the cost of
work injuries is considered part of the cost of production-are unavailable to the vast number of these claimants."

While social security dis-

New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-4 (1953); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-3 (1972); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 461 (1952); Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-29-8 (1952); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-101
(1962); South Dakota, S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. § 62-3-3 (1967); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-903 (1966); Texas, T.x. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 (1967);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 612 (1967); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 23-2-6 (1966). See 2 LARSON § 67.10 (1970).
The elective approach has been a part of the workmen's compensation system from
the beginning, as it was originally thought to be constitutionally mandated. While
this reasoning has been discarded, the elective concept has nonetheless survived. COMMISSION REPORT 44-45. If an employer elects not to be covered by the act, he loses
his customary common law defenses-assumption of the risk, the fellow servant rule,
and contributory negligence. U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR
BULL. No. 206, AGRrcuLTuRAL WoRKERs AND WORebN's COMPENSATION 5 (1969

revision).
5. Professor Larson divides statutory exemptions of particular categories of employees into two groups, the major and the minor. Within the major exemptions
which appear in the majority of statutes are exemptions of: domestic, agricultural, and
casual employees; those employed not in the course of the employer's trade, business, or
profession; and employees falling within the numerical minimum exemption. Under the
numerical minimum exemption, those employers having less than a specified minimum
number of employees are not required to provide workmen's compensation coverage.
The numerical minimums range from less than two employees to less than fifteen employees. IA LARSON § 52.10. The minor exemption category includes: workers in
nonhazardous, public, nonprofit, religious, or charitable employment, newsboys, and
corporate executives. Id. § 50.10.
6. NATIONAL SAFET

CouNca,,

ACCmENT FACTS 23 (1968).

See text accom-

panying note 24 infra.
7. COMMISSION REPORT at 45.
8. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DnE'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 161, STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IAws 1 (1969 revision).
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ability benefits9 may afford some relief, many agricultural workers do
not possess the financial means necessary to pursue a legal remedy to
redress their work-related injuries. 10
Because of the prevalent agricultural exclusion, a vast amount of
legal energy in the workmen's compensation area has been expended in
delineating who is and who is not an "agricultural employee!' within
the meaning of the compensation statutes." Predominant areas of dispute include activities in the commercial production and processing of
agricultural commodities,' 2 and controversies involving employees who
work part time in agriculture and part time in non-agricultural pur3

suits.1

This Note will review the justifications for the agricultural exclusion in the workmen's compensation scheme. Following a discussion
of the various statutory approaches involving workmen's compensation
coverage for the farm worker, judicial rationales attacking the constitutionality of the agricultural exclusion will be examined. Emphasis
will be placed on the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan
in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co.,' 4 the first case to hold that an agricultural exclusion in a workmen's compensation statute is an arbitrary
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970); notes 99-100 infra and accompanying text.
10. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws recognized
that the farm worker is unlikely to have personal insurance or savings. COMMISSION
REPORT 46. In 1969, the median earnings per day of the farm wage worker was $8.50.
232. For recent articles dealing with the plight of agricultural
STATISTICAL AiBsmAcr
workers, including the migrant worker in particular, see, e.g., Givins, Legal Disadvantages of Migratory Workers, 16 LAB. L.J. 584 (1965); Note, The Farm Worker:
His Need for Legislation, 22 MAiNE L. Rlv. 213 (1970); Note, Florida's Forgotten
People: The MigrantFarmworkers,23 U. FLA. L. REv. 756 (1971).
11. See 1A LARSON §§ 53.30-40. See also Annot, 140 A.L.R. 399 (1942); Annot.,
107 A.L.R. 977 (1937); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 954 (1926); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 208 (1925);
Annot., 13 A.L.R. 955 (1921); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 1296 (1920).
12. See, e.g., Pestlin v. Haxton Canning Co., 299 N.Y. 477, 87 N.E.2d 522 (1949),
where claimant was injured while operating a tractor-powered beet topping machine.
The cannery owned the farm, tractor, and machine, and the beets had been sold in advance to the cannery. While the majority held the employee's activity to fall within the
farm labor exemption, the minority felt that the removal of beet tops was the first
stage in the canning process, and that accordingly the agricultural exemption should not
apply.
13. See, e.g., Guerroro v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 128 Tex. 407, 98
S.W.2d 796 (1936), where a florist occasionally raised plants himself, but also purchased shrubs which he temporarily placed in the ground for preservation. The
court held that a person who grows plants for sale is engaged in an agricultural pursuit, while one who is involved in the business of buying and selling nursery stock
which is put in the ground temporarily for preservation is not engaged in agriculture
within the meaning of the act.
14. 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 1973:705

and unreasonable classification in violation of the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Michigan constitutions. Implications
of the Gallegos rationale in expanding the reach of various types of
social legislation to the farm worker will also be considered.
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COVERAGE OF AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES

Justificationsfor the AgriculturalExclusion
A common explanation for the exclusion of agricultural workers
from workmen's compensation statutes is that the exemption was politically expedient as a legislative compromise to secure the rural support needed to enact the first workmen's compensation statutes.,, This
political factor may explain why the exclusion still remains in the majority of the leading agricultural states. 16 Apart from this explanation, an
investigation of the justifications for the agricultural exclusion reveals
that many such arguments are obsolete, and all appear to be untenable.
The most frequently voiced justification for the agricultural exclusion in workmen's compensation schemes is the administrative impracticability of including agricultural workers within the coverage of
the statute.17 When workmen's compensation laws were passed in the
early decades of the twentieth century, it was thought that the farm
employer would be unreasonably overburdened in handling the necessary records, insurance, and accounting. Granting the wisdom of this
reasoning at that early date, the current trend towards large-scale farming with crop specialization and mechanization' s makes such reasoning
unacceptable today. Even the small farmer must now accept the
bookkeeping burdens of income tax, FICA assessments, and unemployment insurance. 19 Consequently, adding compensation insurance
accounting to his list would not place an onerous burden on the farm
employer.
15. See Davis, Death of a Hired Man-Agricultural Employees and Workmen's
Compensation in the North Central States, 13 S.D.L. REv. 1, 4 (1968). New York
passed the first workmen's compensation act in 1910. By 1920, all but eight states had
adopted acts. In 1949, Mississippi became the last state to come under the system.
1 LARSON §§ 5.20, 5.30.
16. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
17. See 1A LARsoN § 53.20.
18. The value of farm machinery and equipment has risen ,from a total of
$12,166,000,000 in 1950 to a total of $34,299,000,000 in 1970. STATSICAL ABSTRACr
579.
19. See Note, Workmen's Compensation-Washington'sRecent Amendments: Universal Mandatory Coverage, Liberalized Benefits, and a Controversial Two-Way Plan,
47 WASH. L. Rv. 717, 722 (1972).
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A second justification for excluding the farm worker from workmen's compensation coverage is that the farmer, unlike the manufacturer, cannot add his compensation cost to the price of his product and

pass it on to the consumer. 20

Because of intense competition and

frequent inability to control the selling price of his product, the farmer's power over his market is often weaker than that of the average

manufacturer or retailer.

However, as Professor Larson recognizes,

should farm labor be covered in all states, there would be no competi-

tive advantage as far as the domestic market is concerned, and the
domestic-world market disparity should not differ because of this

slight increase in domestic farm cost. 2
The legislative histories of various compensation statutes reveal a
third justification for the failure of legislatures to extend workmen's

compensation coverage to farm workers-the philosophy that farming
was not thought to be a hazardous employment deserving of coverage.22 Recent safety studies which indicate a sharp increase in the use

of mechanized equipment on farms and a concomitant high incidence
of death and disabling injury to farm workers point out the fallacy be-

hind such an assumption. 23 In fact, the 2,700 deaths and 230,000
disabling injuries sustained by farm employees in 1967 reflect the very

real hazards involved in agricultural employment. 24

A final justification for the exclusion of agricultural employees is
largely historical. Because of the large number of "family farms" in

operation in the early twentieth century, many legislators feared that
such farms might be compelled to provide compensation coverage for

family members.25

However, it appears that this fear could easily be

20. See 1A LARsoN § 53.20. See also Davis, supra note 15, at 6-9.
21. 1A LASON § 53.20.
22. See Note, supra note 19, at 722.
23. The dramatic increase in the use of mechanized farm equipment, see note 18
supra, brings with it the attendant risks of personal injuries caused by equipment misuse or malfunction. Another and perhaps even more frightening aspect of the hazards
of farm employment is the risk of pesticide poisoning. Powerful pesticides, often
purchased illegally, may be applied in the wrong place or in the wrong amount. Frequently, no advance preparations are made for emergency care in case of an accident.
The farm worker may be given no instructions concerning the hazards surrounding the
use of the poison, precautions about its use, or protective clothing to be worn during
application of the poison. See Harmer, Poisons, Profits and Politics: Cases of Death
and Severe Illness Due to Pesticide Poisoning in California, 209 NATION 134 (1969).
Furthermore, poisons resembling military nerve gas are often used in the agricultural
fields, and there have been numerous cases of farm workers, as well as their children,
suffering serious adverse effects from pesticide poisoning. See Taylor, Nerve Gas in
the Orchards: Pesticide Poisoning,210 NATION 751 (1970).
24. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNCIL, AccDENT FACTS 23 (1968).
25. See Davis, supranote 15, at 5.
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eradicated by excepting family members from the coverage of the act.2"
In addition, the intensity of such fears should have diminished over
the years due to the sharp decline in the number of farms operating in

the United States.
Statutory Schemes: Varying Compensation Coverage for Agricultural
Employees

The legislative response to the plight of the agricultural worker
has been, at best, sporadic. Three different approaches to workmen's
compensation coverage are discernible.

Nine states and Puerto Rico

provide total coverage for agricultural employees, granting them all the
benefits extended to other employees under the workmen's compensation statute. 28 It should be noted, however, that some of these states,
although purporting to provide total coverage, impose numerical minimums which, as a practical matter, exclude all small farms from the
coverage of workmen's compensation20 Fifteen states provide partial
workmen's compensation coverage for the farm worker, extending com-

pensation benefits to such employees but imposing substantial limitations on their availability.80 Coverage may differ widely, sometimes
26. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972), amending
ch. 48, § 138.3 (Smith-Hurd 1969). It should be noted, however,
that it was precisely this type of irrational categorization that prompted the Michigan
Supreme Court to strike down the agricultural exclusion in Gallegos. See notes 67-69
infra and accompanying text.
27. The number of farms in the United States has dropped from a total of
6,518,000 in 1920 to 2,876,000 in 1971, while the average number of acres per farm
has increased from 147 in 1920 to 389 in 1971. STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT 573.
28. The following jurisdictions provide total coverage for the farm worker: California, CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351 (West 1971); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-275 (1972); Hawaii, HAwAu REv. LAws § 396-1 (1968); Massachusetts, MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. 152, § 1 (1965); New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 34:15-36 (1959),
34:15-92 (Supp. 1972); Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § -4123.01 (Page 1965); Oregon,
ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.027 (1971); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11, § 2 (1962);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601 (1967); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.07
(1957).
29. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 616 (Supp. 1970), where, while making no
specific exemption for agriculture, a numerical minimum of three or more employees
is imposed.
30. The designation "partial coverage" encompasses a variety of situations in which
only certain farm workers are accorded full benefits under the act, or in which certain
time or numerical limitations determine the status of coverage under the act. The
following jurisdictions provide partial coverage for the farm worker: Alaska, ALASKA
sTAT. § 23.30.230 (1962) (harvest help and similar part-time or transient help not
covered); Arizona, A=uz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-902 (1971) (exempts agricultural
workers not employed in the use of machinery); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02
(Supp. 1973) (excludes agricultural labor employed by a farmer or agricultural association with nine or fewer regular employees and which employs fewer than twenty
ILL. ANN. STAT.
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extending only to those workers using machinery or power equipment, 1 sometimes covering all
farm employees except those with a
32
minimum amount of earnings or those working only on
a seasonal
3
basis. " Finally, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia pro-

vide no coverage whatsoever for the farm worker. 34
other employees at any one time for seasonal agricultural labor completed in less than
thirty days, provided such seasonal employment does not exceed sixty days in the same
calendar year); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (excludes employees of farmer employing less than 500 man-days of labor per calendar
quarter and all exchange and family labor); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.005
(Supp. 1972) (covers workers engaged in operation of threshing or hulling machines);
Louisiana, LA. Rnv. STAT. § 23:1035 (1964) (covers workers engaged in operation of
harvesting and threshing machinery); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 4 (Supp.
1972-73) (excludes seasonal or casual workers); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 21 (Supp. 1972) (excludes employers of less than three full-time employees, employers with an annual payroll of less than $15,000 for full-time employees, and excludes all seasonal or migratory employees who do not operate machinery or equipment); Michigan, MICH. Coui.
Aws § 418.115 (Supp. 1972) (covers farm workers
who work for 35 hours or more a week for a period of 13 weeks or more per year
for an employer who employs three such regular employees or more; provides only
medical and hospital coverage for employees working 35 hours or more a week for
five or more weeks for an employer who employs at least one such employee);
Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011, 176.041 (1966) (covers only workers engaged as commercial threshermen or balers); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 281:2 (Supp. 1972) (covers farm workers working for an employer who employs
more than two employees); New York, N.Y. WomEEN's ComP. LAw, § 3, group 14-b
(McKinney Supp. 1972-73) (requires coverage of farm workers for 12 months from
April 1 of a given year, if the employer's cash wage payments during the preceding
calendar year exceeded $1,200); South Dakota, S.D. Co,.
LAws ANN. §§ 62-3-15,
62-3-16 (1967) (covers only workers engaged in operation of harvesting machines);
Washington, WASH. REv. CODE § 51.12.020 (Supp. 1972) (excludes seasonal workers
and employees earning less than $150 a calendar year from any one employer); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-49, 27-61 (Supp. 1971) (covers only workers engaged
in power farming for an average of six months per year).
31. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-902 (1971).
32. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 51.12.020 (Supp. 1972).
33. See, e.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 23.30-230 (1962).
34. The designation "no coverage" may apply to statutes in which farm workers
are omitted from a list of covered employments or in which farm workers are definitively excluded from the act. The following jurisdictions provide no coverage for the
farm worker: Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 263 (Supp. 1971); Colorado, COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-2-6 (1964); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2307 (1970);
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-502 (Supp. 1970); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. § 114-107 (1956); Idaho, IAHO CODE § 72-105 (1947); Indiana, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 40-1209 (1965); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.1 (Supp. 1973); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-505 (1964); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-03 (Supp. 1972);
Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.090 (Supp. 1973); Montana, MoNT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 92-202 (1964); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-106 (1968); Nevada, Nav. Rav.
STAT. § 616.060 (1967); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-10-2, 59-10-10 (1960);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1972); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 65-01-02 (Supp. 1971); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 85, § 2 (1970); Pennsyl-
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Several recent legislative developments, however, indicate that the

relatively large number of states denying any workmen's compensation
coverage whatsoever to farm workers may decrease in the future.

For

example, in 1971 Maryland amended its act, repealing a prior exemption of any person employed in agriculture.
New Jersey in 1969
amended its act by striking language which did not require "any employer of farm laborers" to carry compensation insurance. 0 Illinois
and Washington have also recently enacted legislation broadening the
7
scope of coverage for the agricultural worker.1

The recent trend of the legislatures to extend workmen's compen-

sation coverage to farm workers is reflected also in the recommendations of several important nation-wide studies. The Model Act of the
Council of State Governments, for example, would require all agricultural employers to provide coverage, with the exception of those who
have fewer than three employees. 8

Recommended standards compiled

by the United States Department of Labor, furthermore, would cover
farm workers on essentially the same basis as other employees. 0
Most recently, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws recommended a two-stage approach to agricultural coverage. As a first stage, the Commission suggested that as of July 1,
vania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § la (Purdon 1952); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 28-29-7 (1969); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-13, 72-107 (1962);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-906 (1966); Texas, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306 (Vernon 1967); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-43 (1966); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.1-28 (1973); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1 (1970).
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 21 (Supp. 1972). It should be noted, however,
that the recent Maryland amendment defined "farmer" as "one who has three (3) or
more full-time employees or who has a yearly payroll for his full-time employees of at
least fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), provided, however, that this section shall not
apply to seasonal or migratory farm laborers who do not operate machinery or equipment." Id.
36. NJ. REv. STAT. §§ 34:15-36, 34:15-92 (Supp. 1972).
37. Illinois, through legislation effective in 1971, removed large-scale farming
operations from its prior complete exclusion of "work . . . conducted by farmers."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). Washington in 1971
amended its prior list of employments included within the act, which had omitted agricultural employment, to presently "embrace all employments which are within the legislative jurisdiction of the state." WASH. REv. CODE § 51.12.020 (Supp. 1972). It
should be noted, however, that Illinois chose to continue its exclusion for the small
farmer and for the employer of exchange labor, and that Washington chose to exclude
seasonal workers and those employees earning less than $150 a calendar year from any
one employer.
38. CouNCin OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND REHABxuTATION LAw 20, reprinted from SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION (1963 & 1965).
39. U.S. BuREAu OF IABOR SANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 212, STATE
WORKNENS COMPENSATION LAws: A COMPAusoN OF MAJOR PROVISIONS WiTH REcoMnIMNDED STANDARDS 6 (1967 revision).
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1973, each agricultural employer with an annual payroll in
$1,000 be required to provide full workmen's compensation
to all of his employees. As a second stage, all farm workers
covered on the same basis as all other employees as of July

excess of
coverage
would be
1, 1975,

without regard to limitations on employer payroll size.4"
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AGRICULTURAL EXCLUSION
IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES

In contrast to the recent proposals arising out of these national
studies must be placed the recalcitrant attitude of many state legislatures whose rural representatives and lobbyists are firmly opposed to
reform in the area of the workmen's compensation coverage of agricultural employees. 4 ' Thus, proponents of coverage for farm workers
have at times turned to the courts for assistance, basing their objections
primarily on the argument that the agricultural exclusion denies equal

protection of the law in violation of state constitutions or the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.
General Equal Protection Standards
Two different tests of equal protection analysis have been developed by the Supreme Court over the years. The first of these two
tests has often been termed the "traditional" or "minimal scrutiny"
equal protection test. Here, the weakest of reasons for differentiation
between classes will suffice, for so long as the classification bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose, it will be upheld. The classification is permissible, in other words, as long as there
is any reasonable basis for its existence.42 The second of these two
40. COMMISSION RPORT 46. The Commission recognized that the use of group
insurance covering several employers may serve to ease any administrative burden
involved in its recommended plan. Id.
41. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278,
1302-08 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Among those
classifications held to bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose
are certain licensing statutes, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan
statute denying bartending licenses to all women except the wives or daughters of
male bar owners had the conceivable legitimate legislative purpose of avoiding social and
moral problems attendant to employment of women in bars), and prohibitions on advertising, Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (New York City
ordinance prohibiting motor carriers from hiring-out advertising space on their trucks
while permitting firms owning trucks to advertise their own products was upheld, as
those who hire out advertising space might present a greater danger of traffic distraction than those who advertise their own goods). For an excellent discussion of
the "traditional" equal protection test, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAr. L. REv. 1065, 1077-78 (1969).
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tests has been at times designated the "strict scrutiny" or "steppedup" test. Here, whenever a "fundamental interest" is affected or the
basis of classification involves a "suspect criterion," a stepped-up standard of judicial review emerges, requiring that the classification serve a
compelling state interest in order to be held constitutional.48
It is unlikely that the agricultural exclusion in workmen's compensation statutes is examinable under the "strict scrutiny" test, because such a classification neither impinges upon a fundamental interest nor is based upon a suspect criterion. In the first place, the Supreme
Court has recently stated that only those rights "explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution" will be deemed "fundamental" for equal
protection purposes, and that "social importance is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. ' 44 On
the basis of this general restriction imposed by the Court and analogous cases denying the status of "fundamental interest" to an indigent's right to receive state welfare assistance, 4 it seems highly un43. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969). See also Developments
in the Law, supra note 42, at 1087-1132. Among those classifications considered by
the courts to be "suspect" and thus sufficient to invoke strict judicial scrutiny include:
race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), see note 48 infra; national ancestry, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); alienage, Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); illegitimacy, Gomez v. Perez, 93 S. Ct. 872
(1973).
Wealth alone, on the other hand, has never been held by the Supreme Court
to be a "suspect" classification. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294 (1973). See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
The term "fundamental interest," whose potential infringement in a statutory
classification justifies use of the stepped-up standard of judicial review, has been defined by the Supreme Court recently to consist of only those rights which are "explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288 (1973). "Fundamental interests," generally
held sufficient to trigger the stepped-up standard of judicial review, include: voting,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); procedural rights of criminals, Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956); and interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Contrary to the implications suggested in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), education is not a fundamental constitutional right, San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1299 (1973); nor, for example, is the right
to housing, Ludsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
44. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. CL 1278, 1288,
1296 (1973).
45. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), for example, the Supreme
Court held that a Maryland statute denying additional welfare benefits per child to a
family once it reached a maximum size did not impinge on any fundamental interests
and therefore would not be examined under the "stepped-up" standard of equal protection analysis. Workmen's compensation benefits are likely to fall within the same
category as welfare benefits, for it would appear that compensation benefits, like pub-
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likely that the right to receive workmen's compensation coverage would
be accorded the status of a "fundamental" interest.4 6 The only alternative basis for applying strict judicial scrutiny to the agricultural exclusion in workmen's compensation statutes, then, would constitute
making the assumptions that (1) most farm workers are poor, and
hence, the statutory classification parcels out compensation coverage
on the basis of wealth, and (2) wealth is a "suspect criterion." However, the Supreme Court has never considered wealth alone to be a
suspect basis of classification, and has exhibited no present indications
of an intent to do so.4 7 Should wealth be deemed "suspect," agricullie welfare assistance, though involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," present "intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
. . . [which] are not the business of [the] Court." Id. at 485, 487.
46. In the Rodriguez case, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that the right
to receive public education was a "fundamental right" protected by the Constitution.
Consequently, the Court applied the traditional standard of equal protection analysis in
upholding the Texas scheme of financing public education, which was based in part on
the amount of property taxes collected in each school district. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973). In denying "fundamental"
protected status to the right to receive education, the Court postulated that the list of
fundamental rights would be limited to those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution, regardless of the social importance of other interests which are
not constitutionally protected-interests such as the right to receive public school education and, in all probability, the right to be covered by a scheme of workmen's compensation benefits. Noting that "the importance of a service performed by the State
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause," 93 S. Ct. at 1295, the Supreme Court
summarized:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus the
way to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. ...
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 93 S. Ct. at 1297 (citations omitted).
47. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278
(1973).
The Supreme Court has found violations of equal protection in instances where
wealth was the basis of classification; however, the decision in each case rested upon
the presence of a "fundamental interest," not the nature of the classification per se.
See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But see McDonald
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), where the Court, in holding
that Illinois' failure to provide absentee ballots for incarcerated electors awaiting trial did
not violate the equal protection clause, mentioned that a "careful examination" was in
order whenever lines are drawn on the basis of wealth.
In Rodriguez, however, the Court stated that "this Court has never heretofore held
that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny,"
93 S. Ct. at 1294, the Court refused to apply the stepped-up standard of judicial review.
The Court concluded:
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tural workers denied workmen's compensation benefits could conceiva-

bly demand stepped-up scrutiny of the exclusion, due to the disadvantaged, impoverished existence experienced by many farm workers, especially migrants. 48 In the meantime, however, the courts undoubtedly

will continue to refuse to apply the "stepped-up" standard of equal
protection analysis when examining the alleged unconstitutionality of

classifications in social legislation, such as workmen's compensation
schemes, which do not impinge upon any constitutionally guaranteed
49
"fundamental" rights.
The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that
they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children
in districts having more assessable wealth. . . . [A] sufficient answer to
appellee's argument is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. 93 S. Ct. at 1291.
See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972), where the Court stated:
"So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to
tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutionalstrait
jacket. The very .omplexity of the problems suggests that there will be more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them" (emphasis added). See also
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) where the Court, in ruling that a California
procedure barring public low income housing projects without the approval of a majority vote in a referendum did not violate equal protection, made no mention whatsoever of wealth as a suspect classification.
48. Race is the archetype of suspect bases of classification. The Supreme Court
has never offered a full explanation for the treatment of race as suspect, even though
the Court has never deviated from its 1941 statement in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216, that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect" and should be subjected "to the most rigid scrutiny." For a recent reaffirmation of this expression, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967).
Policies underlying the suspect treatment of race would appear to include efforts
to protect the minority-like characteristics associated with many racial groups, and attempts to recognize that race is a trait "over which an individual has no control and
for which he should receive neither blame nor reward." See Developments in the
Law, supra note 42, at 1124-27. Utilization of such classifications is not likely to be
related to the furtherance of a legitimate state interest. Wealth arguably exhibits
these same characteristics when low income segments of the populaion are at issue,
for distinctions based on wealth likewise tend to point out the disadvantaged, stigmatic characteristics of the "have-nots" of society, and similarly unrelated to furthering
any legitimate state interest. See Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 IARv. L. REv. 7, 21 (1969). As the agricultural exclusion
involves distinctions based on wealth, it arguably triggers the necessity for a compelling state interest to be served by such ordinances. See notes 70-72 infra and accompanying text. The courts, however, have generally refused to go so far as to apply
stepped-up review to classifications based on wealth. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. For background evidence linking the agricultural worker to classifications based on wealth, see note 10 supra and accompanying text.
49. It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court of Michigan in Gallegos v.
Glaser Crandell Co., 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972), the first, and heretofore
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Recently, there have been indications that the Court is developing

a new equal protection standard which would replace the "traditional"
test with a more intensive judicial scrutiny of statutory classifications
and which, at the same time, would impair the stepped-up test of "strict
scrutiny.

50

Under this new standard, the constitutionality of a statute

will no longer be satisfied when a court perceives that a classification
has a rational relationship to any legislative purpose which the court
envisions to be "legitimate." Rather, the statutory "means" of classification, in order to comply with the new equal protection standard,
must have a substantial relationship to the legislative purposes actually

chosen by the state legislatures.5"

Furthermore, the previously devel-

only, direct judicial examination of the constitutional validity of the agricultural exclusion of workmen's compensation statutes, applied the "traditional" test of equal
protection analysis, rather than the stepped-up standard of judicial review. See notes
67-76 infra and accompanying text.
50. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 H v.L REv. 1, 17-24 (1972). The author postulates, on the basis of recent
Supreme Court decisions, that the Court has replaced the "traditional" standard of
equal protection with a significantly more stringent test, called an "intensified means
scrutiny." The commentator observes that statutory classifications with only a minimum of rationality will not necessarily pass equal protection muster under the new
test. Rather, the Court, using this new standard, "is prepared to acknowledge substantial equal protection claims on minimum rationality grounds." Id. at 19. In comparing the new test with the old, the commentator notes:
The intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close the wide gap between the
strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the
old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the minimal from
virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry. Id. at 24.
This new development in equal protection analysis has been judicially recognized,
at least in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
923 (2d Cir. 1973); Aguayo v. City of New York, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
In referring to the analysis in Gunther, supra, and recent Supreme Court decisions, the
Second Circuit stated in the Richardson case:
Clearly, these decisions seem to foreshadow an expanded judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, although the outer boundary of that
inquiry remains ambiguous. Id. at 931.
51. One commentator has recently explained the workings of this new standard
as follows:
Stated most simply, [the new test] would have the Court take seriously a
constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends. The equal protection requirement that legislative classifications must have a substantial
relationship to legislative purposes is, after all, essentially a more specific
formulation of that general principle. .

.

.

[The new test] would have the

Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial
basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the
justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations
created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing. .

.

. The yardstick for the

acceptability of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legislatures,
not "constitutional" interests drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices.
Gunther, supra note 50, at 20-21.
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oped stepped-up standard will not be abandoned, since the presence of
fundamental interests or suspect classifications will dictate that the

means of classification
must be "necessary" and able to withstand
"strict scrutiny."'52
Traditional Failure of Equal Protection Attacks on Workmen's CompensationStatutes

Few parties have mounted successful equal protection attacks
against the various classifications or exclusions in workmen's compen-

sation statutes,53 and, in particular, none of the early attacks on the agricultural exclusion has succeeded. A noted illustrative case is New
York Central Railroad v. White," in which a wife was awarded compensation for the death of her husband who was killed while in the

employ of defendant railroad company. In argument before the Supreme Court, the railroad company challenged the act as denying the
railroad equal protection of the law since the act excluded agricultural

and domestic workers but required railroad employers to maintain coverage for its employees. The Court, in applying the "traditional" equal
protection analysis, rejected defendant's argument, stating:
But, manifestly, this cannot be judicially declared to be an arbitrary
classification, since it reasonably may be considered that the risks inherent in these occupations [agricultural and domestic work] are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar.5"
The absence until recently of case law dealing with the constitutionality of the agricultural exclusion indicates that proponents of cov52. See note 43 supra.
53. See, e.g., Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd., 255 U.S. 144 (1921) (workmen's compensation law, mandatory as to coal-mining companies, but permissive as to
all other corporations, does not deny equal protection of the laws). Johnston v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 248 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1918) (Alaska compensation act
applying only to mining industry held not violative of equal protection); Ives v.
Smith Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911) (workmen's compensation act
imposing absolute liability on employers for injuries to employees engaged in specified
dangerous activities did not violate equal protection).
54. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
55. Id. at 208. See also Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152
(1919) (exclusion of farm laborers does not render a state compensation statute unconstitutional as class legislatidn nor as violative of the equal protection clause);
Roush v. Hefflebower, 225 Mich. 664, 196 N.W. 185 (1923) (statement in dicta that
the power to except farm laborers is based on the fact that there is a reasonable and
substantial distinction between conditions under which farm labor is performed and
conditions under which work in other employments is done); Mackin v. DetroitTimken Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N.W. 49 (1915) (it is within the power of the
legislature to classify both employers and employees, if the classification is not fanciful or arbitrary and applies impartially and equally to each member of the class).

Vol. 1973:7051

EQUAL PROTECTION

erage for farm workers soon abandoned their constitutional attacks on
the agricultural exclusion after these early judicial setbacks. A notable
exception, although not dealing specifically with the agricultural exclusion, is the 1960 decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyatt & Cannon Foundary Co.56 Gauthier involved an attempt to have the special statutory limits on silicosis benefits struck down as a violation of equal protection. Claimants argued
that a statute which might have been constitutional when passed could
become unconstitutional by the disappearance of the conditions which
had sustained the constitutionality of the original enactment. The
court rejected the argument, holding that at the time the claimants'
rights accrued the classification was not obsolete. However, the court
did not rule out the possibility of reconsidering the claimants' argument
in a future case when there was stronger evidence of obsolescence:
Any argument that the scheme is now "obsolete" as to future disabilities must wait consideration on a record which presents some facts
from which it might be deduced that the legislative reasoning had lost
all value with the passage of time and change of circumstances. 57
The Gallegos Decision
An ideal case for unconstitutionality due to the obsolescence of a
statutory classification, found not to be present in the Gauthier decision, presented itself finally in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co.5" as applied to a different statutory scheme-the agricultural exclusion of
workmen's compensation. Choosing not to adopt the constitutional
obsolescence doctrine, however, and applying, instead, the "traditional"
test of equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
in Gallegos that Michigan's separate compensation treatment for agricultural employees had violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. As a result of this decision, the Michigan
court may have started a reversal of the earlier judicial trend which did
not regard the agricultural exclusion as violative of the farm laborer's
equal protection of the laws.
In Gallegos, plaintiffs were migrant workers employed to harvest
cucumbers by defendant Glaser Crandell. Both plaintiffs were injured
by falling from the same exterior stairway which led to living quarters
supplied for them by the defendant employer. The Michigan statute
56. 360 Mich. 510, 104 N.W.2d 182 (1960).
57. Id. at 523-24, 104 N.W.2d at 188-89. The court's reasoning appears
to be in part an explication of the "traditional" equal protection test.
58. 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972), rev'g 34 Mich. App. 489, 192 N.W.2d
52 (1971).
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was of a hybrid variety,59 providing full coverage only for those agricultural employees who were paid an hourly wage or salary (and not

on a piecework basis) and who worked thirty-five or more hours per
week for thirteen or more consecutive weeks for the same employer,
as long as the employer had at least three such regular employees within

his hire. Furthermore, the statute provided medical and hospital coverage for only agricultural employees who worked thirty-five or more

hours per week for five or more consecutive weeks for the same employer who had at least one such employee within his hire. 6
After both the hearing referee and the Workmen's Compensation

Appeal Board ruled that they lacked authority to decide constitutional
issues, plaintiffs placed two arguments before the Michigan Court of

Appeals attacking the constitutionality of the statute. First, plaintiffs
argued that the act, by excluding piecework farm laborers from cov-

erage while covering permanent salaried or wage-earning farm laborers,
was unconstitutional as a restriction on the constitutional right to inter59. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
60. Section 115 of the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act of 1969, MIcH.
Comp. L ws § 418.115 (1948), provides that the coverage of the act shall apply to:
(a) All private employers, other than agricultural employers, who regularly
employ 3 or more employees at 1 time.
(b) All private employers, other than agricultural employers, who regularly employ less than 3 employees if at least 1 of them has been regularly
employed by the same employer for 35 or more hours per week for 13 weeks
or longer during the preceding 52 weeks.
(c) All public employers, irrespective of the number of persons employed.
(d) All agricultural employers of 3 or more regular employees paid hourly
wages or salaries, and not paid on a piecework basis, who are employed 35
or more hours per week by that same employer for 13 or more consecutive
weeks during the preceding 52 weeks. Coverage shall apply only to such
regularly employed employees. The average weekly wage for such an employee shall be deemed to be the weeks worked in agricutural employment
divided into the total wages which the employee has earned from all agricultural occupations during the 12 calendar months immediately preceding the
injury, dnd no other definition pertaining to average weekly wage shall be
applicable.
(e) All agricultural employers of 1 or more employees who are employed
35 or more hours per week by that same employer for 5 or more consecutive
weeks shall provide for such employees, in accordance with rules established by the director, medical and hospital coverage as set forth in section
315 for all personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment
suffered by such employees not otherwise covered by this act. The provision
of such medical and hospital coverage shall not affect any rights of recovery
that an employee would otherwise have against an agricultural employer
and such right of recovery shall be subject to any defense the agricultural
employer might otherwise have. Section 141 shall not apply to cases, other
than medical and hospital coverages provided herein, arising under this subdivision nor shall it apply to actions brought against an agricultural employer
who is not voluntarily or otherwise subject to this act. No person shall be
considered an employee of an agricultural employer if the person is a spouse,
child or other member of the employer's family, as defined in subdivision
(b) of section 353 residing in the home or on the premises of the agricultural
employer.
(f) All other agricultural employers not included in subdivisions (d) and
(e) shall be exempt from the provisions of this act.
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In rejecting this argument, the court held that the act

applied to residents and nonresidents alike:
[I]t cannot be said that [the act] has 'no other purpose. . . than to chill
the assertion of constitutional rights [in this instance the right to travel]
,62
by penalizing those who chose to exercise them ....

Second, plaintiffs argued that the exclusion was unconstitutional as an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification denying the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution.6 3 The court disagreed, declaring that state legislatures presumptively act within consti-

tutional boundaries despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality, 64 and that the legislature can choose to institute re-

forms by taking one step at a time. 65 In rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the intermediate court was particularly impressed with

legislative findings that indicated coverage for all agricultural workers
would bear a prohibitive cost.66
Appealing to the Michigan Supreme Court, plaintiffs relied on the
same bifurcated attack rejected by the Michigan Court of Appeals. In
a decision producing four separate opinions, the majority, by applying

the "traditional" test of equal protection analysis, held that the different
compensation treatment accorded farm workers in section 115(d) of

the act, as compared to the treatment given to other types of employees,
did violate plaintiffs' rights to equal protection. The majority, in
noting the three classifications of employers created by section 115
-all
private employers, all public employers, and all agricultural
employers 67 -found the last classification to be unconstitutional.
Agricultural employers, regardless of the skills of their employees or the
activities engaged in, are accorded a special treatment and classification
61. Plaintiffs relied heavily on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in
which the Supreme Court invalidated state welfare laws which set a one-year residence
requirement to qualify a person for public assistance. Such a requirement was
thought to impair the fundamental constitutional right of a citizen to move from
one state to another. Because the requirement was viewed as serving no compelling
state interest, it was held in Shapiro to be violative of equal protection under the
stepped-up standard of judicial review applied by the Court. See note 43 supra and
accompanying text.
62. Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 34 Mich. App. 489, 493, 192 N.W.2d 52, 54
(1971), rev'd, 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972).
63. See MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1963).
64. 34 Mich. App. at 495-97, 192 N.W.2d at 55-56. The court quoted from
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 34 Mich. App. at 496-97, 192 N.W.2d
at 55-56.
65. The quotation from McGowan cited Sembler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
66. 34 Mich. App. at 497, 192 N.W.2d at 56.
67. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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of their employees not accorded any other private or public employer.
Such treatment is impermissible, clearly discriminatory and has no rational basis.68
The majority reasoned that there was no rational basis for singling out

for different compensation treatment the work of a laborer on a farm
from the similar activities performed by a laborer in industry, wholesaling, retailing, or building. Based on the court's rationale, therefore,

.it
would appear that any workmen's compensation scheme which offers
agricultural employees treatment significantly different from that accorded other employees in general will be unconstitutional.6 9

In a concurring opinion, Justice T.G. Kavanagh acknowledged the
basic reasonableness of a broad classification of workers into an agricultural class as opposed to other classes, such as "industrial workers,"
but considered the creation of two separate subclasses-agricultural
workers covered by the act and those not covered-as unconstitutional.
The concurring Justice stressed first that the excluded subclass (agricultural workers paid on a piecework basis or not employed at least
thirty-five hours a week for at least twelve consecutive weeks for the
same employer) consisted of "seasonal workers" and was largely composed of blacks, chicanos, and Indians. Noting that seasonal agricul-

tural workers comprise one of the poorest segments of society, 70 Justice
Kavanagh then determined that the combination of this subclassifica-

tion based on wealth coupled with "a possible fundamental interest as
found in Shapiro' 71 caused section 115 to trigger the "stepped-up"

standard of judicial review for equal protection analysis. Finding that
68. 388 Mich. at 654, 202 N.W.2d at 791 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 667, 202 N.W.2d at 804. The Gallegos Court indicated that any differential treatment accorded a worker merely because he was an agricultural employee
would have no rational basis and would be unconstitutional:
There is no basis for distinguishing the work of a laborer who drives
a truck at a factory from a laborer who drives one on the farm or for any one
of numerous other labor activities "on the farm" as distinguished from the
same activity in industry, wholesaling, retailing, or building. There is no
basis for singling out for an exclusion piecework "on the farm" but not elsewhere. There is no basis for a special definition of "weekly wage" for farm
labor as distinguished from any other type of labor. "All private employers"
come under the act if they regularly employ 3 or more employees at one
time. On the other hand, only "agricultural employers" who employ 3 or
more employees, not on piecework, 35 or more hours per week by the same
employer for 13 or more weeks during the preceding 52 weeks come under
the act. Id.
70. Justice T.G. Kavanagh was chided by the majority for taking judicial notice
of these and other facts not in the record. Id. at 659-60, 202 N.W.2d at 787.
71. Id. at 673, 202 N.W.2d at 794, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). Justice Kavanagh does not state what this "possible fundamental interest" is.
Because plaintiffs presented it as a separate argument, the right to travel may not be
the fundamental interest referred to by Justice Kavanagh. See note 61 supra.
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no compelling state interest would justify the creation of this subclassi-

fication of seasonal agricultural workers, Justice Kavanagh would have
held the statute unconstitutional on that basis.72

As support for its

result, the concurring opinion emphasized the transformation of "farming" into an "agricultural industry," in which even the small farms that
do exist cannot be distinguished from any other "small, family operated
business." Furthermore, Justice Kavanagh stated that administrative
and financial burdens resulting from total coverage are highly unlikely,

in light of withholding tax and social security already imposed on all
farm employers, and in light of laws covering all agricultural workers
in jurisdictions where numerous migrant workers are located. 3

By applying the "traditional" test of equal protection to the agricultural exclusion, the majority in Gallegos properly recognized the ir-

rationality of a separate classification for agricultural employees within
a workmen's compensation scheme. In noting that there is no basis for

distinguishing labor activity on the farm from labor activity in industry,
nor for singling out piecework performed on a farm from other types of
employment, the majority opinion acknowledges the dearth of justifications for the agricultural exclusion.7 4 Justice Kavanagh's concurring

opinion, while perhaps of limited utility due to its apparent characterization of wealth as a "suspect criterion" and its resultant application
72. 388 Mich. at 674-75, 202 N.W.2d at 794. In another concurring opinion,
Justice Williams, while siding with the majority in maintaining that facts in the record
were not sufficient to establish a "suspect" classification based on wealth, agreed with
Justice Kavanagh's view that the subclassification creating exceptions from the act was
violative of equal protection. Justice Williams based his result, however, on the argument that the creation of a subclassification of "seasonal agricultural workers" was
"altogether unreasonable and lacking in rational basis" and therefore unconstitutional
even under the traditional test for equal protection analysis. Id. at 675-77, 202
N.W.2d at 795. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
In a dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that § 115(e) did not discriminate
against migrant farm workers; rather, the statute reflected a justifiable legislative decision to distinguish between large and small farms, and even provided migrant
workers with a special remedy (medical and hospital coverage) unavailable to nonagricultural workers for small industrial employers. Id. at 677-79, 202 N.W.2d at
795-96.
73. Id. at 674, 202 N.W.2d at 794. Justice Kavanagh cited California and Ohio
as jurisdictions with a high migrant worker population where all agricultural workers
are covered by workmen's compensation. Id. at 674 n.12. See note 28 supra and
accompanying text.
74. Under the new "intensified means scrutiny" approach to equal protection, the
agricultural exclusion appears to be even more susceptible to attack. If, in light of
the absence of justifications for the agricultural exclusion, the exclusion arguably has
no rational nexus with a legitimate state interest, see notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text, it would be even more difficult to prove that the exclusion has a substantial relation with the legislature's purpose, within the meaning of the "new" equal
protection test. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
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of the stepped-up standard of equal protection analysis,'75 is valuable,
however, for its implicit recognition of the doctrine of changing conditions and obsolescence of constitutional justifications which was previously rejected in Gauthier.76
IMPLICATIONS OF

Gallegos

In recognizing the irrationality of excluding a particular group of
agricultural laborers from compensation coverage, or of segregating the
entire agricultural labor force for separate treatment, Gallegos may result in widespread ramifications both within and without the law of
workmen's compensation. Certainly its rationale can be used as direct
support for an attack on the total or partial exclusion of farm workers
currently existing in forty state jurisdictions. 77 Surprisingly enough,
compensation coverage may in fact prove to be a boon to many unsuspecting farmers. As legal services become available to more farm
workers, the farm employer may find himself subject to substantial
personal injury verdicts. 78 When compensation coverage is undertaken by the farm employer, however, the risk of personal liability
evaporates. 79
It is also conceivable that Gallegos can be used to attack the statutory exemption of other particular categories of employees from workmen's compensation-notably domestic servants, who are excluded
from coverage in forty-one states 8 0 Administrative burdens of record-keeping and correspondence have traditionally been the major justification for exclusion of domestics. 8 ' The cold reception given by
75. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
76. See 388 Mich. at 674, 202 N.W.2d at 794. See also notes 56-57 supra and
accompanying text.
77. It would appear that the Gallegos rationale, which on its facts applied to a

statute which made provisions for some agricultural employees, see note 60 supra
and accompanying text, would command greater persuasiveness when applied to a
statute totally excluding farm workers from its reach.
78. Employers not covered by compensation arguably are taking undue chances,
as substantial jury awards have been made against them. In Pezzo v. Patemo, 302
N.Y. 884, 100 N.E.2d 176 (1951), for example, a farmhand, who had suffered relatively minor injuries when his trousers were caught in a tractor, received a $12,000 jury
award. See also BULL. No. 206, supra note 4, at 3.

79. Under the typical workmen's compensation act the employee and his dependents, in exchange for compensation benefits, relinquish their common law right to
sue the employer for damages for injuries covered by the act. See 1 LARSON § 1.10.
80. See 2 LARSON § 50.10.
81. COMMISSION REPORT 46-47. As stated by the Commission:
By their numbers alone, employers of household workers create a formidable
task of record-keeping and correspondence. A single household may employ a
bevy of transient, part-time workers, such as gardeners or babysitters, during
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the concurring opinion of Justice Kavanagh in Gallegos to this
justification as it applied to the agricultural exclusion might prove of

assistance in striking down this major exclusion.8 2 Similar attacks on
the exclusion of casual workers, employees of nonprofit, religious,
charitable, or public institutions, and newsboys may also succeed in
light of Gallegos. Despite the fact that each category possesses practi-

cal or historical factors supporting its exclusion from the act, all can
arguably be depicted as "clearly discriminatory [with] no rational

basis.,, 3
Outside the area of workmen's compensation as well, the Gallegos
rationale may provide ammunition to attack the exclusion of agricultural workers from federal and state social legislation. At the federal
level, agricultural workers have always been excluded from the provi-

sions of the National Labor Relation Act (NLRA) .4 Thus, farm
workers are denied federal protection in organizing into labor unions

to bargain collectively and to engage in other concerted activities sanctioned by section 7 of the NLRA.s5

In addition, agricultural em-

ployees are denied access to the National Labor Relations Board's
adjudication of employer and union unfair labor practices.8s
The legislative history of the NLRA evidences a total lack of con-

cern for the problems of agricultural labor.87

While the real reason

a year. The number of new households and the constantly shifting location
of households add to the difficulties of notification and auditing. Id.
82. It could be argued that farm work is inherently more dangerous than domestic
work, and therefore more deserving of compensation benefits. Thus, a court which
chooses to emphasize the hazardous nature of farm employment in striking down a
compensation provision excluding farm workers from coverage might not apply the
same reasoning to the domestic worker exclusion. However, the court might be dissuaded if evidence of the staggering number of accidents which occur within the home
was forcefully presented by advocates seeking abolition of the domestic worker exclusion. See, e.g., Nader, Home Unsafe Home, 89 LAms' HoME JourNAL 70 (Jan. 1972).
Over 20 million injuries, 4 million of which are disabling, and approximately 30,000
deaths occur annually in American homes. Id. at 72.
83. See 388 Mich. at 669, 202 N.W.2d at 791.
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1970). The NLRA states: "When used in this Subchapter . .. tihe term 'employee' shall include any employee . .. but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer .... ." Id. § 152(3). Domestic servants are also excluded under the NLRA. Id. § 152(3).
85. Section 7 of the NLRA, entitled "Rights of Employees. . ...
" provides in part:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. ....
Id. § 157.
86. Id. § 158.
87. For an excellent review of the legislative history concerning the exclusion of
farm laborers from the NLRA, see Morris, Agricultural Labor and National Labor
Legislation, 54 CALWF. L. Rnv. 1939 (1966).
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for the exclusion lies in the fact that it was a concession on the part of
supporters of the NLRA seeking support from congressmen representing rural districts, 88 two other rationales were supplied in 1935 to jus-

tify the congressional approach.8 9 First, Congress was convinced that,
due to the serene nature of agricultural labor relations in the 1930's,
there was no need for application of the NLRA to agricultural employment. 9" This belief was, of course, unfounded in light of the
widespread agricultural labor strife following the depression. 1 Second, supporters of the agricultural exclusion maintained that NLRA
regulation would impose impossible financial burdens upon the farmer.92 There was some merit to this argument due to the weak bargaining position of many farm employers faced with perishable crops,
bad weather, and unpredictable production, prices, and markets.9 3 Yet
this rationale is considerably weakened in light of the successful organization of the food processing industry under the NLRAI and the
organization of field workers under some state labor laws.9"
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),9 designed to maintain
a minimum standard of living for all industrial workers engaged in
commerce, was amended in 1966 to include farm workers. However,
the Act contains limitations which effectively exclude the majority of
agricultural workers. The chief exclusion is a 500 man-day limita88. Id. at 1954-55.
89. Id. at 1968.
90. See Hearings on S.1550 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 3638-39 (1939).
91. For a compilation of American agricultural strikes in the period 1930-39,
see U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTCS, DFP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 836, LABOR UNIONISm IN AMRICAN AGRICULTURE

17 (1945).

92. See Hearings on S.1550, supra note 90, at 3580-84.
93. Agricultural Labor and National Labor Legislation, supra note 87, at 1971.
94. See NLRB v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280, 282 (10th Cir. 1961), enforcing 129
N.L.R.B. 966 (1960).
95. Hawaii and Wisconsin have enacted labor laws protecting farm workers in
organizational and bargaining activities. See Note, The Farm Worker: His Need for
Legislation, supra note 10, at 236-37.
Of course, should the agricultural exclusion under the NLRA be successfully attacked under the Gallegos rationale, the jurisdictional standards of the National Labor
Relations Board would work to exclude the employees of small farms since the Board,
with reference to other operations, currently asserts jurisdiction over only those nonretail operations having an annual outflow or inflow across state lines of at least
$50,000. See Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). It is conceivable that
the Board could designate a lower standard applicable only to agriculture, should farm
workers be included within the Act. See Note, The Farm Worker: His Need for
Legislation, supra at 221-22.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970). The FLSA is best known for its minimum
wage provisions.
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tion 97 which denies coverage to workers on farms employing less than
500 man-days of agricultural labor during any calendar quarter of the
preceding year. 98 Since the 500 man-day rule exudes the same arbitrariness as the Michigan piecework classification, Gallegos could be
used to extend the coverage of the FLSA to all agricultural laborers.
Similar effort could be directed towards the Social Security Act,99
which limits its coverage to farm workers who are paid more than
$150 in a calendar year or who work for an employer twenty days or
more when paid on a time basis.100
State legislation discriminating against the farm laborer could also
be subject to the Gallegos rationale. Unemployment insurance and
minimum wage laws are two principal potential targets at the state level.
At the present time, Hawaii is the only state which includes farm laborers in its unemployment compensation laws.' 0 ' Again, the major
justification given by the other states for exclusion lies in a belief that
agriculture presents insurmountable administrative and financial costs
for a program of unemployment insurance. 102 Only seven states provide for a minimum wage for farm workers, and even these seven jurisdictions either limit the number of workers covered or deny to the
farm worker the same minimum wage given to industrial employees.' 03
CONCLUSION

Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co. adds a new dimension to the

struggle of the agricultural employee to better his lot. Its equal protection analysis should provide a viable foundation for an attack on
workmen's compensation statutes which discriminate against the farm
97. Id. at § 213(a) (6).

The 500 man-day limitation applies only to agricultural

employees.
98. A fanner employing about six workers during a full calendar quarter would
not use 500 man-days of agricultural labor. S. RP. No. 91-83, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

56 (1969). For a discussion of the FLSA as applied to agricultural workers, see Note,
The Farm Worker: His Need for Legislation, supra: note 10, at 223-26.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
100. Id. at § 409(h)(2). This limitation applies only to agricultural employees.
101. See HIwAut REV. STAT. H§ 383-1(8), 383-2 (1968).
102. See StBcOMM. ON MIGRATORY LABOR OF THE SENATE COMm. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, THE MIGRATORY FAPm LABOR PROBLEM IN THE UNrrED STATES, S.

REP. No. 1006, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
103. These seven states are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-320(g)(6)-(10) (Supp.
1971); Hawaii, -AwAu REV. LAws § 387-1(2) (1968); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 151, § 2 (1965); Michigan, MicE. COMP. LAws § 408.394 (1967); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-34 (1965); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. H9 59-3-21
(d), 59-3-22 (1953); and Oregon, ORE. R1nv. STAT. § 653.020(1) (1971). See Note,
The Farm Worker: His Need for Legislation, supra note 10, at 231-32.
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worker, and the migrant worker in particular. The Michigan Supreme
Court wisely recognized in Gallegos that farming is no longer a simple
family affair existing in a bucolic setting of lakes and green hills.
Rather, farming today, even on a small scale, is a modem mechanized
industry replete with incalculable possibilities of injury to those who
work within it. A workmen's compensation system which ignores
these realities and chooses instead to require agricultural laborers, unlike industrial workers, to fend for themselves when injured in workrelated accidents is untenable in modem society and, according to Gallegos, violates the equal protection clause. Furthermore, the Gallegos
rationale seems to provide a basis for attacking provisions of social legislation without as well as within the workmen's compensation area which
arbitrarily discriminate against the agricultural employee.

